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Faculty and Deans

The drive for corporate democracy.

Giving Voice to

Shareholder Choice

by JAYNE W BARNARD

I

N NEW YORK, in order to get on the ballot as a

thousands of proxy disclosure documents and ballots
(prepared by a securities specialist at the standard
hourly rate) at one's own expense.
Given these rules, it is no wonder that there is almost always a contest for even the most minor public
office whereas elections for positions on corporate
boards only rarely involve a proxy fight. In 1989, according to the Investor Responsibility Research Center, out of more than 15,000 public companies, there
were only a dozen proxy contests for positions on corporate boards.
Many critics have been asking why it is so costly for
a capable investor or other interested individual to
seek election to a corporate board. Every publicly

c4ndidate for statewide office, one needs only to
pq.y a nominal filing fee and gather up 20,000
voter signatures, which is usually an easy task. Once
that th~eshold is met, the cost of printing and distributing balIots is borne by the government.
In th~t same state, unless selected by incumbent
managers, the only way to be elected as a director of a
publicly owned company is to launch a full-scale
proxy contest. This involves printing and mailing
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held corporation must send out a proxy statement
each year in advance of the annual shareholder meeting. Since the proxy statements always list the candidates nominated by incumbent management, why not
require these companies also to include candidates
independently nominated by non management shareholders? Eligibility to make nominations could be limited to those who own (or could compile the support
of others who collectively own) a substantial amount
of stock, say $500,000, or enough to represent some
percentage of the total, say 3 percent. Other safeguards could be imposed to ensure that gadflies,
"flakes:' and takeover artists do not take advantage of
this simple, though valuable, nomination privilege.

"Shareholder access to the proxy has been
an issue since the federal securities laws
were enacted:'
Noted academics like Louis Lowenstein of Columbia Law School and Melvin Eisenberg of the University of California have advanced proposals to provide
shareholders access to the proxy statement to permit
them to nominate directorial candidates. Savvy practitioners like Martin Lipton have argued that direct access to the proxy would correct the existing
imbalance of power between incumbent management and outside investors and might even curb the
takeover binge. Ralph Nader has endorsed shareholder access to the proxy. Congressmen and senators
on both the left and the right have submitted bills that
would provide shareholder access. To date these bills
have been defeated.
As it stands now, the typical shareholder receives a
ballot each year containing a single slate of nominees
hand-selected by incumbent management. For example, ten candidates would be nominated for ten board
positions. There are no other choices and, because
proxies have been submitted to management and tallied in advance, the process of nominating from the
floor at the annual meeting is invariably futile. Thus,
as one observer has noted, the typical Third World
dictatorship often enjoys more "democracy" than do
American shareholders.
AGITATING FOR ACTION

Now a new group of activists has come along seeking a greater voice in the selection of those men and
women who run America's big corporations. Some,
like oil industry analyst Kurt Wulff, have attempted to

gain access to the proxy one corporation at a time.
Others, like T. Boone Pickens and his United Shareholders Association, have been seeking a legislative
solution to the access problem. Big institutional investors, notably the California Public Employee Retirement System (CaIPERS), have been agitating for any
effective means by which major shareholders can
have a voice in directorial selection and long-range
corporate planning. The SEC, which considered
adopting access rules in the past, before abandoning
the effort during the Reagan administration, has remained silent on the growing access debate.
Corporate managers dismiss access efforts, arguing
that there is ample opportunity for serious shareholders to playa role in choosing board members. Invitations to "write to our nominating committees" are
often included in the annual proxy statement. Shareholders are asked to "give us your ideas for an improved board of directors, and we will carefully
consider them:' However, in a survey of 300 public
companies conducted by The Conference Board, the
futility of making suggestions to board nominating
committees became apparent.
SURVEY SAYS

Nominating committee respondents were asked
where they first learned of their ultimate board nominees. Fully nine out of ten identified the chief executive officer as the prime source of nominees.
Shareholders, on the other hand, significantly influenced the nomination of candidates in only a handful
of companies. Indeed, more than eight out of ten survey respondents did not find shareholders to be a useful source or even a source at all in the search for
board candidate nominees.

"The SEC has remained silent on the growing
access debate:'
Recently, more and more corporations have created
board nominating committees, often made up exclusively of outside directors. A recent survey suggests
that as many as 70 percent of the Standard & Poor's
500 companies now have some form of nominating
committee. But that development has been accompanied by an increasing resistance to shareholder nominations. Many companies have adopted stringent
bylaws or operating procedures to dictate the form
that shareholder nominations must conform to for
consideration by the board. Many require a full biog-
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raphy and financial information such as eventually
would be required by the SEC if the nomination were
submitted to the shareholders. Some even require a
signed consent by the candidate before a shareholder's suggestion will even be presented to the nominating committee.
Shareholders - particularly holders of large blocks
of stock - argue that the will of dissatisfied investors
should not be frustrated by these nominating committee "gatekeepers" appointed by management.

"The typical Third World dictatorship often
enjoys more democracy than do
shareholders of American corporations:'
Shareholders are guaranteed by law the right to
elect corporate directors; that should include the right
to nominate directorial candidates as well. In practice
and tradition, however, the right to nominate exists
only for those who are present at the annual meeting
or those willing to undertake their own independent
proxy solicitation. The right to nominate does not include those unwilling to bear the cost of a separate
mailing but merely hope to be free riders on the corporate proxy statement.
In the political world, the U.S. Supreme Court has
ruled that the right to vote must include an effective
voice in the nomination process. Thus, black voters
excluded from participating in all-white Democratic
Party primaries were found to have been denied their
constitutional rights and the exclusionary primary system was dismantled. Alas, there are no constitutional
rights on which shareholders may rely. Thus, shareholder activists have turned to Congress to give them
a real voice in the selection of corporate boards.
The Senate has before it the Corporate Takeover Reform Act, a bipartisan bill that provides for any shareholder or group of shareholders representing at least 3
percent of a company's voting shares to nominate
directorial candidates. Biographical information
would be included in the management proxy, where
they are given "equal space, coverage, and treatment;' as are management's candidates.
PROXY MOXIE

The need for this reform was highlighted last year
when the Delaware Supreme Court protected Time,
Inc:s decision to merge with Warner Communications
notwithstanding the overwhelming desire of shareholders instead to sell their shares to Paramount, Inc.,
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at a substantial premium. The court's ruling was based
on the express proposition that "corporation law does
not [require] directors ... to follow the wishes of a
majority of shares:'
Assume a majority of Time's shareholders now wish
to express their dissatisfaction with the Warner transaction in the only way left to them: by replacing the
incumbent board (or at least some of its members). In
the absence of an access provision, their only means
of doing so would be through the prohibitively expensive mechanism of a proxy fight that as a practical
matter is only likely to be pursued by a raider seeking
a change in management for his own profit. Access to
the proxy would permit an alternative means of expression, at a minimal cost to shareholders as a group.
What would be the long-term impact of the Senate's
access proposal? Some corporate executives fear it
would encourage corporate raiders or result in a
board unable to make effective decisions and transfixed by short-term considerations. Others concede it
would be sparingly used and seldom effective in actually replacing a board member because of the high
costs of follow-up solicitation necessary, even where
the ballots would be circulated at corporate expense.
They acknowledge, though, that the mere existence of
access rights would stimulate more interchange between management and institutional investors who
now own over 50 percent and sometimes as much as
90 percent of the stock in many major corporations in
this country.

"The futility of making suggestions to
nominating committees became apparent:'
Shareholder access to the proxy has been an issue
since the federal securities laws were enacted in the
1930s. Its vitality has risen and fallen with political
and economic tides. Whereas most corporate managers today, as they did in 1934, reject the notion that
shareholders have any contribution to make to the
process of corporate governance, their most sophisticated investors feel otherwise. Some investment managers now control portfolios ranging into the billions
of dollars, and are increasingly insisting that their
views be heard.
As the composition of shareholder ownership in
public companies changes from large numbers of individual investors with small holdings to a much
smaller concentration of institutional investors with
large holdings, access to the proxy will be increasingly an issue to watch.
D
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